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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On 31 December 2014 NATO will hand over its final security 
responsibilities to local Afghan forces. The handover will raise new 
questions for Chinese policy in Afghanistan. On the one hand, Beijing 
wants a stable Afghanistan. It does not want the country to become 
either a haven for Uyghur militancy, or for instability to spread through 
the region. On the other hand, Beijing is reluctant to become too deeply 
involved in Afghanistan, conscious of the West’s difficult experience over 
the last decade and fearful of attracting the attention of international 
terrorist groups.  
Against this backdrop Beijing is unlikely to make any meaningful security 
commitment to Afghanistan. Instead China will continue to enhance its 
diplomatic and economic engagement with the country. Whilst Chinese 
analysts are uncertain about whether such an approach will ensure 
stability in Afghanistan, it is seen as China’s least-worst policy option. 
 
 
 CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
2  
 
 
At the end of 2014 the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) will hand over its final responsibilities for Afghanistan’s security to 
local forces. While a small but significant NATO and US security, training 
and support presence will remain in the country, more than a decade of 
direct effort led by the West to bring stability and security to Afghanistan 
will largely come to an end.   
Western countries are not, however, the only ones with an interest and a 
stake in Afghanistan’s security. China has long been concerned about 
the spread of extremist ideas and activism from Afghanistan through 
Central Asia and across its own borders, particularly into its western-
most territory, Xinjiang. This area is home to a Uyghur population, a 
predominantly Sunni Muslim Turkic ethnic group, of approximately ten 
million people. The Western military drawdown in Afghanistan therefore 
raises questions for China. This will be a defining period for China’s 
relationship with its neighbour Afghanistan. 
China has made a minimal security contribution to Afghanistan since 
2001. Its aid commitment to Afghanistan’s reconstruction has been a 
very modest US$250 million.
1
 Diplomatically too, China took a low-key 
approach to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2012. Andrew Small of the 
US think tank the German Marshall Fund sums it up succinctly: “Until 
then [the end of 2011], China had sat completely on the sidelines. They 
just used to send people to read out statements in meetings.”
2
  
In the last two years, however, Beijing has struck a far more proactive 
tone. Beijing has pursued many multilateral and bilateral diplomatic 
tracks with Kabul and Afghanistan’s neighbours. In 2012, the then 
security chief Zhou Yongkang made a visit to Kabul, becoming the most 
senior Chinese leader to visit the country in decades. In 2014 China 
appointed a special envoy to Afghanistan and committed to increasing 
its economic footprint in the country substantially.  
Despite the extra diplomatic and economic emphasis, it is highly unlikely 
Beijing will commit any type of armed force to Afghanistan, instead 
leaving security responsibility to the new Afghan government. Beijing 
has seen the difficulties faced by the United States in Afghanistan over 
the past 13 years (and the Soviets and the British before them), and is 
sceptical of the effectiveness of foreign troops in the country.  
Beijing’s main interest is to prevent the spread of terrorism, and in 
particular terrorist ideology, into Xinjiang, as well to ensure that 
Afghanistan does not become a strong base for Uyghur militancy. It is 
not clear that leaving security in the hands of the Afghans, or indeed 
making huge economic investments in the country, will deal with this 
challenge. Of course, the other side of the equation is that committing 
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militarily to Afghanistan would not necessarily deal with these challenges 
either.  
The goal of this Analysis is to understand China’s likely policy responses 
in Afghanistan in coming years. It will begin by outlining the challenges 
Beijing faces as a result of the withdrawal of ISAF. The following section 
will review the debate in China over the threat posed by Afghanistan. 
The final section will outline the contours of China’s main policy 
directions. 
DOES CHINA HAVE AN AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM?  
Ethnic unrest and terrorism in Xinjiang have been an ongoing concern 
for Chinese authorities for decades. Uyghurs chafe under Beijing’s rule 
in Xinjiang. Tensions have been particularly heightened since 2009, 
when nearly 200 people died in ethnic violence in the provincial capital of 
Urumqi.
3
  
Violent attacks have increased in recent years and, on occasion, spread 
beyond Xinjiang. In October 2013, Uyghur terrorists were linked to an 
attack in which a car was set alight and driven into Beijing’s central 
square, Tiananmen. The three occupants of the car and two bystanders 
were killed.
4
 In May 2014 a mass knife attack at Kunming train station in 
China’s south killed 29 and left dozens injured. Within Xinjiang, 100 
people died in violent incidents in the last week of June 2014, including 
59 ‘terrorists’ gunned down by police.
5
 A Communist Party–supported 
imam was stabbed to death in Kashgar in August.
6
 A further 50 people 
were reported killed in violence in Luntai County in September, including 
six people killed in bomb blasts and 40 people, described as ‘rioters’ by 
some state media, gunned down by police.
7
  
This has prompted a stern security response. A tough approach to 
terrorism in Xinjiang is not new but the latest iteration seems even 
stronger than in the past. At a national security study session in April 
2014, President Xi Jinping said that “[We must] make terrorists become 
like rats scurrying across a street, with everybody shouting ‘beat 
them!’.”
8
 There have been reports of significant numbers of Uyghur 
arrests in recent months,
9
 as well as door-to-door searches of homes. 
Substantial financial rewards are being offered to informants.
10
 
Numerous government policies, both at the central and local level, cause 
Uyghur disgruntlement. Economic policies to promote Xinjiang’s 
development have led to large-scale migration of Han Chinese to the 
province from other parts of China. There is a sense that the benefits of 
Xinjiang’s economic development are not being distributed equally 
among different ethnic groups. At the same time, there is tension over 
state restrictions on religious expression. For example, ‘Project Beauty’, 
launched in 2013, is a program aimed at encouraging Uyhgur women to 
dress less conservatively.
11
 More recently, the city of Karamay 
Ethnic unrest and 
terrorism in Xinjiang have 
been an ongoing concern 
for Chinese authorities 
for decades. 
 CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
4  
 
introduced rules to temporarily ban people who are sporting beards or 
wearing hijabs from catching the bus.
12
 And there have been reports of 
Uyghur students or government officials being forced to break their fast 
during Ramadan.
13
 
Xinjiang is important to the central government. It occupies one-sixth of 
China’s landmass. It neighbours eight countries and sees significant 
cross-border trade. There are also substantial hydrocarbon and subsoil 
mineral deposits within Xinjiang, including an estimated 34 per cent of 
China’s gas reserves, 40 per cent of coal reserves and 30 per cent of oil 
reserves.
14
 Similarly, significant amounts of gas and oil are imported via 
pipelines flowing from Central Asia through Xinjiang to China’s east 
coast markets.  
The problems China faces in Xinjiang are predominantly internal. 
Nevertheless there are important external connections, although their full 
extent is difficult to gauge given the lack of reliable, publicly available 
information.  
Sunni Uyghur militant groups based near the Pakistan–Afghanistan 
border have claimed responsibility for a small number of attacks in 
China. The most prominent Sunni Uyghur militant group, the Turkistan 
Islamic Party (TIP), which is based in porous regions of the Afghanistan–
Pakistan border, claimed responsibility for several bus bombings in 2008 
— although authorities denied terrorist involvement — and also for an 
attack in Kashgar in July 2011 that killed three dozen people.
15
 However, 
cases with clear foreign involvement remain the exception rather than 
the rule. External militant groups have not directly claimed responsibility 
for any attacks since the upsurge in violence in 2013. 
Although the capability of external Sunni Uyghur militant groups to 
launch attacks in China appears to remain limited, their ideological 
propaganda has become noticeably more sophisticated. Since 2012, the 
TIP has co-issued videos with the media wing of the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU). The TIP publishes a quarterly Arabic-language 
publication, under editor Abdullah Mansour, called Islamic Turkistan. In 
2012 Mansour emerged as the TIP’s leader, and since then the group 
has issued increasingly frequent and more sophisticated videos praising 
attacks in Xinjiang. This has raised the profile of the organisation. In 
particular, the release of videos supporting the group knife attack in 
Kunming and the bombing in Urumqi in 2014 tied the narrative of these 
attacks to the TIP, even though there was no clear operational link.
16
   
External links to the mainly domestic terrorist threat do not just emanate 
from Afghanistan. The spread of terrorist and religious propaganda into 
Xinjiang was consistently identified by Chinese interlocutors in research 
interviews as the greatest external threat to Xinjiang’s stability.
17
 Online 
material can, however, be produced anywhere. For example, the TIP 
has a branch in Syria which is creating its own online content.
18
 
Numerous interviewees also indicated that conservative Islam is 
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increasingly finding its voice among the traditionally moderate Uyghur 
population. This is seen as an indication of foreign influence over Uyghur 
religious practices. 
A number of terrorist groups have also expressed ideological support for 
the Uyghur cause. In July 2014, Islamic State leader Abu Bakr Al-
Baghdadi said in a speech to rally global support that “Muslim rights are 
forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine.” In 2013, al-Qaeda leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri endorsed the right of militants to fight Chinese in 
Xinjiang. He has previously endorsed the “liberation” of Xinjiang, 
referring in 2012 to “China's takeover of East Turkestan.”
19
  
Even though this ideological support for the Uyghur cause hasn’t yet 
translated to identifiable operational coordination against Chinese 
targets, there is concern among numerous analysts that unrest and 
discontent in Xinjiang could be adopted as a cause by extremist groups 
in South Asia or the Middle East. In particular, the 2014 Al-Baghdadi 
speech received a lot of attention in China. Beijing is also concerned that 
any new instability in Afghanistan may spread more widely through 
Central Asia or South Asia, which too could have an impact on the 
security and stability of Xinjiang.  
Chinese strategists and politicians view these risks as real and thus see 
a need to contribute further to the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Hu 
Shisheng of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations 
(CICIR) states, “Now with the US strategic focus shifting, neighbouring 
countries cannot just let Afghanistan descend into chaos.”
20
 Li Wei, also 
of CICIR, indicates that: “Although the US will leave behind a level of 
military force, the pressure on terrorist forces in Central and South Asia 
will inevitably be eased…in this upcoming period pressure from terrorism 
in Xinjiang will be quite large.”
21
  
DEBATING THE AFGHANISTAN RISK 
If Chinese policy-makers broadly agree that stability in Afghanistan is an 
important Chinese interest, they diverge on the level of risk Afghan 
instability would actually pose to China’s security. Most experts agree 
that the threat of direct spill-over from Afghanistan into China is limited. 
China and Afghanistan are neighbours in name only: the border is a 
mere 92 kilometres long, and inaccessible. As Hu Shisheng of CICIR 
noted in an interview with China Youth Daily: “After the NATO withdrawal 
in 2014, the security threat to China’s western region is fairly indirect… 
direct entry from there [Afghanistan] into China’s Xinjiang is fairly 
difficult.”
22
 
There are three main schools of thought about the implications for China 
of ISAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. In the first school, some scholars 
feel that the ISAF withdrawal will actually improve the security situation 
in Afghanistan. Ren Xiao of Fudan University said in an interview with 
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the author that the withdrawal of ISAF and US forces from Afghanistan 
may eliminate one of the drivers of conflict in the country. Li Xin of the 
Shanghai Institute for International Studies concurs, saying that an 
improvement in the security environment “was one of a number of 
possible future scenarios for Afghanistan.”
23
  
The second school of thought predicts a worsening of the security 
situation in Afghanistan in ways that increase the risk to China. Some 
Chinese analysts argue that the drawdown of ISAF will provide Uyghur 
militant groups with an opportunity to co-opt other terrorist groups to their 
cause, or that these groups could allow Afghanistan to function as a 
base for Uyghur militants. Hu Shisheng, for example, argues that: “The 
Pakistan and the Afghanistan Taliban are sympathetic towards the 
Uyghurs. So we absolutely have to pay attention to this, in a way that 
perhaps we did not before.”
24
 A number of scholars argue that the 
uncertainty surrounding Afghanistan post-ISAF means threats could 
come from new or reinvigorated groups.
25
 For example, Zhao Huasheng 
of Fudan University, one of China’s pre-eminent experts on Central Asia, 
points to a number of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and surrounding 
countries that could benefit from the troop withdrawal:  
The strength of religious extremism and terrorism continues to 
expand. In recent years, established groups such as the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami and the East 
Turkestan Islamic Movement [a name sometimes used for the 
TIP] have continued their activities. At the same time a number 
of new extremist organisations continue to emerge.
26
 
Finally, the third school of thought acknowledges that the troop 
drawdown in Afghanistan poses a significant threat to the stability of the 
region and to China, but hold that it can be largely managed 
domestically. For example, Pan Guang of the Shanghai Academy of 
Social Sciences wrote in 2013 that “China faces two major challenges in 
the region, first the withdrawal of the US and NATO from Afghanistan, 
and second Central Asia entering a period of leadership transition.” He 
added that this could lead to a number of threats, including trafficking of 
personnel and weapons into Xinjiang, the spread of extremist 
ideology, and closer cooperation between terror organisations. However, 
Pan stated in an interview with the author that, despite these threats and 
challenges, “the situation in Xinjiang can be controlled.”
27
 Some scholars 
in the third school believe that the impact of Afghanistan’s security 
environment will be limited regardless of the Afghan situation, because 
problems in Xinjiang are mainly domestic. 
A CONSENSUS AROUND POLICY 
Despite these different risk assessments, the policy response most 
Chinese scholars advocate is deep diplomatic and economic 
engagement, avoiding military intervention.
28
 This is in line with current 
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government rhetoric. However, the level of security training to be 
provided is still a subject for debate among Chinese analysts, and 
government officials have not yet been explicit.  
There are four main reasons why China is likely to avoid military 
intervention in Afghanistan. First and foremost, the efficacy of military 
intervention is seen as limited. Even an observer who sees risks in post-
ISAF Afghanistan such as Zhao Huasheng, has argued against the 
military option: “The Taliban has existed in Afghanistan for some time 
and to eliminate it through military force is impossible.”
29
 
Second, Chinese policy-makers fear that military intervention would 
make China a target for non-Uyghur militant groups, something often 
referred to as ‘inviting trouble’ (引火烧身).30 As noted in the previous 
section global, international terror groups have largely avoided China as 
an operational target, despite offering intermittent moral support to 
Uyghur militants. Beijing would like to keep it that way.  
Third, there are serious questions about China’s military capability to 
handle a situation like Afghanistan. The modern People’s Liberation 
Army has very limited experience deploying combat troops overseas. Its 
combat capabilities are undoubtedly weaker than those of the ISAF 
forces.  
The fourth reason China is likely to avoid military action is its long-held 
position of non-interference. This is not the major factor; interviewees for 
this paper consistently stated that Beijing’s reticence to intervene 
militarily is driven by weighing up the benefits and costs.
31
 Of course, in 
this instance there is no difference between the policy consensus and 
the principle of non-interference, so no decision needed to be made.  
One can speculate about what China might do were the security 
situation in Afghanistan to deteriorate so badly that instability spread 
through the region. But even in this circumstance, all interlocutors 
indicated that China would be extremely unlikely to deploy military force 
into Afghanistan. The best (or only) response, as Shi Lan of the Xinjiang 
Academy of Social Sciences put it, would be to “strengthen one’s own 
immunity” (提高自己的免疫力).32 Thus any external threat to China’s 
internal security will likely be dealt with using the traditional methods of a 
strong security presence on the ground in Xinjiang, economic investment 
as an incentive for internal stability, and the curbing of online material.  
OPTIONS FOR SECURITY COOPERATION 
There are, however, options for China to take a greater role in 
Afghanistan’s security that do not involve military intervention. China has 
provided small-scale security training to Afghanistan, primarily in the 
form of mine clearance and counter-narcotics training.
33
 China also 
signed an agreement with Afghanistan in 2012 to train around 300 
Afghan police officers in China over four years, although this is a tiny 
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proportion of an Afghan national police force that numbers approximately 
150,000 members.
34
 It is also overshadowed by the on-going NATO and 
US effort to support and train the Afghan National Security forces that 
will see some 9,800 US troops and 3000 troops from other NATO 
nations to remain in the country at the end of 2014. The number of US 
troops will halve by the end of 2015, with a minimal force left after 
2016.
35
 
Training is one of the few areas where there is disagreement among 
Chinese analysts over the appropriate policy response. On the one 
hand, there is a fear that China would be inviting trouble from terrorist 
groups by being seen as a too-prominent backer of the Afghan security 
services.
36
 On the other hand, provision of training would be a more 
direct way to shape the security and stability of Afghanistan.  
One option would be to provide training or equipment for Afghanistan’s 
security forces. Mine clearance or counter-narcotics training can be 
expanded relatively easily. Institutions in China may also run ad hoc 
classes in areas such as judicial training for Afghan security personnel. 
One of the more innovative training suggestions comes from Hu 
Shisheng. Along with co-authors Raffaello Pantucci of the Royal United 
Services Institute in London and Ravi Sawhney of New Delhi’s 
Vivekananda International Foundation, Hu proposed that China and 
India could jointly train a “mineral-assets protection force” in 
Afghanistan.
37
  
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a political, economic 
and military grouping including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan could also play a role, albeit limited. Shanghai 
University of Political Science and Law is developing a facility to promote 
judicial exchanges among the members of the SCO (国际司法交流合作
培训基地).38 It is specifically designed to provide legislative and judicial 
training for lawyers, counterterrorism personnel, border personnel and 
officials from judicial and enforcement departments from SCO full 
member countries.
39
 This training could potentially be expanded to 
include Afghanistan nationals on an ad hoc basis. 
The SCO could play a limited role in containing any new instability to 
Afghanistan. The organisation, after many years of debate, is likely to 
expand in the next year, with the Chinese MFA strongly supporting bids 
by India and Pakistan to become full members.
40
 Iran too has been 
rumoured as a new member. If these nations are admitted, then every 
single nation bordering Afghanistan, with the exception of Turkmenistan, 
would be a member of the SCO. The SCO has a poor record of 
cooperation on a range of issues, including on Afghanistan — each 
member pursues its own Afghanistan policy.
41
 There are nascent signs 
that cooperation is improving just a little. In August 2014 the SCO staged 
it largest military training exercises since 2004. Similarly, the agreement 
on member expansion is another small indicator of cooperation.  But 
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distrust between Central Asian States is still widespread, and it will 
continue to hinder consensus in the SCO. Thus, cooperation will likely 
be restricted to joint exercises, non-military training, intelligence sharing 
and perhaps enforcement cooperation on non-traditional security issues.  
Counter-narcotics cooperation between Afghanistan and China offers 
another area of potential collaboration. Until now, joint efforts have been 
on a small scale, but there are suggestions of further cooperation in this 
area. For example, Zhang Kun of Xinjiang University wrote in a journal 
article for the Yunnan Police Officers Academy that China should push 
for cooperation between Urumqi and Kabul airports to curb direct point-
to-point drug trafficking.
42
 Several interviewees agreed that this kind of 
cooperation would be entirely feasible and desirable.
43
 However, much 
of the drug traffic emanating from Afghanistan goes overland through 
Central Asia. China has pushed the SCO for an anti-drug function to be 
added to the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS).
44
 So far this 
has not occurred formally, although some Chinese state media outlets 
recently wrote that “the SCO's anti-terrorism organ has decided to crack 
down on drugs and cyber-crimes.”
45
 Language and cultural limitations 
appear to be an issue as well. Liu Yi from Xinjiang Police Academy 
along with Zhang Kun, for example, have argued that a lack of capability 
in languages such as Pashto and Urdu is hampering the quality and 
speed of regional investigations into drug trafficking.
46
  
ENHANCED DIPLOMACY 
Since 2011, China’s diplomatic engagement on the Afghan issue has 
strengthened significantly. This will, in all likelihood, continue. There are 
two major threads to China’s diplomatic engagement on Afghanistan. 
The first involves strengthening bilateral relations with Afghanistan. In 
June 2012, China and Afghanistan declared a “strategic and cooperative 
partnership.”
47
 China has strategic partnerships with dozens of countries; 
the exact title of the partnership varies for each country and there is no 
set definition as to what they entail, so their utility should not be 
overstated.
48
 In the case of Afghanistan, it could be seen as a sign of 
increased Chinese focus on the country, with an emphasis on Chinese 
developmental contributions to Afghanistan, but not more than that.  
In July 2014, China announced the appointment of a special envoy to 
Afghanistan—Sun Yuxi, a former ambassador to both Afghanistan and 
India. According to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sun 
was appointed “to step up the communication with Afghanistan and all 
parties concerned and safeguard lasting peace, stability and 
development of Afghanistan and the region.”
49
 What this exactly means 
is unclear. Other Chinese special envoys, for example in Darfur, have 
been quite active in mediation between opposite sides of a conflict.
50
 
This is less likely (but not impossible) in the Afghan case, given the 
prominent role the United States already has as a mediator. In the 
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Afghan context it is foreseeable that the envoy would at least act as point 
man for China between various groups within Afghan society. 
China has long maintained contacts with a broad range of actors and 
groups in Afghanistan, including the Taliban.
51
 Since the Karzai 
government came to power in 2001, contact with the Taliban has often 
been via intermediaries. But more recently Beijing has reportedly been 
rebuilding the direct links it had with the Taliban prior to the US invasion 
in 2001.
52
 This will continue and perhaps strengthen after the ISAF 
withdrawal. Yang Cheng of East China Normal University frames 
engagement with a broad variety of groups as a way to promote an 
Afghan-led approach to the country’s development:  
China will continue to firmly support the ‘Afghan-led, Afghan-
owned’ reconstruction process… China may maintain contact 
with all political and economic forces in Afghanistan, rather than 
just the central government, making it possible for all to 
participate in the Afghan peace mediation process.
53
  
Zhao Huasheng argues that China is likely to have continuing contacts 
with the Taliban:   
Plans for Afghanistan and the Taliban are thus… long term and 
based on the consideration that China will have enduring 
interactions with the Taliban. Ultimately, China is not opposed to 
the organisation but is instead opposed to terrorism, separatism, 
and extremism.
54
 
The contacts that China fosters with the Taliban are an effort to reduce 
the space Uyghur terrorists can operate in. Beijing seeks guarantees 
that Afghanistan won’t function as a base for Uyghur militant groups. It 
also wants Chinese investments in Afghanistan protected from Taliban 
attacks.
55
 There are mixed views as to how effective this approach will 
be. Some Chinese sources say that the Taliban doesn’t want to raise the 
ire of Beijing because of its relationship with Pakistan. Others question 
the Taliban’s commitment to China’s requests.
56
 At the same time there 
have been numerous Taliban attacks on Chinese resource projects in 
Afghanistan.
57
 
The second major thread to China’s diplomatic engagement in 
Afghanistan focuses on Afghanistan’s other neighbours. Since 2012, 
China has vigorously pursued bilateral, trilateral and multilateral 
dialogues with countries surrounding Afghanistan. The ‘Heart of Asia’, a 
multilateral effort launched in 2011 in Istanbul, is aimed at getting 
Afghanistan’s regional neighbours to take on a greater role in the 
country’s future development. A meeting was to be held in the Chinese 
city of Tianjin in August 2014, but it was postponed due to the electoral 
deadlock in Afghanistan, which was only resolved in late September.
58
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In February 2012 the first Afghanistan–Pakistan–China trilateral dialogue 
at official levels was established, with the fourth round to be held in 2014 
in Kabul.
59
 The dialogue has spawned numerous other consultative 
mechanisms such as a Track-II Afghanistan–Pakistan–China dialogue 
first convened in August 2013.
60
 Beijing has also established trilateral 
dialogues on Afghanistan between India, China, and Russia, as well as 
China, Pakistan, and Russia.
61
 These supplement significant long-
standing annual foreign minister dialogues between Russia, China, and 
India trilaterally, and China and India bilaterally, which in recent years 
have included more involved discussions on Afghanistan.
62
 In addition, 
China and Russia hosted a 6+1 Dialogue on the Afghanistan issue in 
Geneva in March 2014.
63
 
China has also stepped up its engagement with the United States on this 
issue. Ambassador James Dobbins, Obama's special representative for 
Afghanistan, now has thrice-yearly meetings with his Chinese 
counterpart to discuss future areas of cooperation.
64
 China and the 
United States have convergent interests in Afghanistan, so it is natural 
for both sides to seek common areas for cooperation and understanding.  
Interlocutors indicated that Beijing hopes to achieve a consensus on the 
Afghan issue among surrounding countries, because they will be at the 
front line of containing any new Afghan instability. This includes attempts 
to increase regional cooperation on transnational crimes such as drug 
trafficking. Beijing will also encourage neighbouring countries to 
contribute as much as possible to Afghanistan’s reconstruction.
65
  
Chinese analysts understand diplomacy’s limitations regarding the issue 
of Afghan security, but it is one of the few policy options Beijing chooses 
to use in Afghanistan and thus it will be pursued actively. Shi Lan of the 
Xinjiang Academy for Social Sciences sums it up: “Dialogue is the best 
choice we have for solving this issue. Of course, I feel it may be difficult 
to achieve results with dialogue, but we have to try.”
66
 
ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT 
China views economic engagement as its main contribution to securing 
stability in Afghanistan and the region.
67
 Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
elaborated on this during a February 2014 visit to Kabul: “We hope to 
see the development of Afghanistan. Development is fundamental and 
only with economic growth can the poverty problem be solved and the 
foundations of terrorism and extremism be eliminated.”
68
 
Three key factors will shape the nature of China’s economic 
engagement with Afghanistan. First, and most obvious, will be the 
security situation. Protecting Chinese economic assets and personnel in 
Afghanistan has been difficult. The largest Chinese investment in the 
country, a copper mine at Mes Aynak signed in 2007, was attacked 19 
times over the subsequent five years, and 40 Chinese engineers had 
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departed due to the security situation.
69
 As Zhao Huasheng notes, 
“Chinese investors are powerless in the face of Afghanistan’s political, 
social, and religious conflicts, and China is incapable of solving these 
political and security problems on its own.”
70
  
China’s economic aid will likely focus, if the security situation allows, on 
its traditional strength of building basic infrastructure. Beijing will, 
however, pursue other aid options if the security situation does not allow 
work on infrastructure projects.
71
 Zhu Yongbiao of Lanzhou University 
indicates what the alternative might look like: “We can sustainably 
provide alternative crop seeds and demonstration projects, offer 
textbooks and facilities for schools and education institutions, expand the 
number of Afghan students studying in China, and increase the level of 
aid to Afghan refugees.”
72
 
The second key factor will be the attitude of Chinese enterprises. Some 
Chinese companies have already undertaken aid projects in Afghanistan 
funded by third-party countries, despite the security risk. If Chinese 
economic aid is expanded, one would expect that Chinese firms would 
continue to shoulder the risk of aid projects in the country. Firms also 
often have some level of control in the development of Chinese-funded 
aid projects, and thus lower-risk projects could be pursued.  
It is unclear whether Chinese firms will be willing to bid on resource 
investment projects in Afghanistan. On the one hand, investment in 
Afghanistan’s significant undeveloped mineral deposits has great 
potential, as Zhao Huasheng writes, “to contribute to the reconstruction 
of Afghanistan’s economy by providing the country with capital, 
technology, and employment opportunities, as well as considerable 
profits and tax revenue.”
73
 At the same time it gives China access to 
resources to drive its economy. In addition, Chinese firms have both the 
technical and local knowledge to competitively bid for resource projects. 
Both of the Chinese flagship resource investment projects in Afghanistan 
(the copper mine near Kabul and an investment in oil fields in northern 
Afghanistan) were the brainchild of local executives working in the 
region, rather than of the central government,
74
 although both projects 
did receive significant government support.
75
  
On the other hand, China’s current resource projects in Afghanistan 
have faced setbacks. As mentioned above, both have suffered Taliban 
attacks. There is also the logistical challenge of transporting resources in 
a landlocked country with poor infrastructure. Numerous Chinese 
observers feel that China’s entry into Afghanistan’s resource sector was 
premature for these reasons.
76
 Additionally, development of the copper 
mine near Kabul has been halted by the discovery of a rich 
archaeological site, which is being excavated. So, future resource 
investments face significant challenges. Much will hinge on Chinese 
resource companies’ willingness to operate in an unstable area and the 
profitability of individual projects. 
It is unclear whether 
Chinese firms will be 
willing to bid on resource 
investment projects in 
Afghanistan. 
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A number of Chinese firms have invested in smaller projects beyond the 
resource sector, in areas such as telecommunications. These generally 
carry a lower security risk than resource investments and are likely to 
continue. It is probable that the government will also back these projects, 
and that strong political and diplomatic support for investment will remain 
or even increase. The Chinese Government does have some influence 
in both resource and non-resource investments; it will continue to push 
Afghanistan to improve its investment environment. It could also offer 
policy or financial incentives for Chinese investors in Afghanistan. 
A third factor in Chinese economic engagement in Afghanistan will be 
the attitude of the Afghan Government. Chinese interlocutors noted that 
requests from the Afghan Government will have some influence, 
particularly over the type of economic aid delivered.
77
 This is consistent 
with approaches to Chinese aid seen elsewhere in the world, where the 
host government, either local or national, often suggests a project, or co-
proposes it with a Chinese firm that seeks to access aid funding.  
CONCLUSION 
China has an interest in Afghanistan’s long-term stability. ISAF’s 
contribution to that goal has been uneven, but there is a real possibility 
that the security situation in Afghanistan will deteriorate further once 
ISAF’s internal security role finally comes to an end. None of this, 
however, has produced in China any great desire to replace ISAF in 
Afghanistan.  
China’s main interest is ensuring that instability doesn’t spread to 
Xinjiang. But Afghanistan is only one, relatively small, part of China’s 
Xinjiang problems. The spread of extremist information is seen as the 
primary external threat to Xinjiang. These problems are not limited to 
Afghanistan, and cannot be solved by military intervention. More 
generally, China understands the limited returns from ISAF’s 13-year 
mission in Afghanistan, and sees the rewards of direct military 
intervention as questionable. It also wants to avoid becoming a target for 
existing terrorist groups that have largely not attacked Chinese interests 
to this point.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that China will not be totally passive in relation to 
Afghanistan and is stepping up its efforts to secure its long-term interests 
in the country, relying on its traditional strength of economic 
engagement, combined with a newly proactive diplomacy. The question 
is whether these limited means will achieve China’s aims in Afghanistan. 
But for the moment, even those Chinese experts who consider the 
threats posed by the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan to be grave 
favour China’s current approach as simply the best way to play a tough 
hand. 
 
China’s main interest is 
ensuring that instability 
doesn’t spread to 
Xinjiang. But Afghanistan 
is only one, relatively 
small, part of China’s 
Xinjiang problems. 
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